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CLAIMING PRIVATE LAW FOR THE LEFT:
EXPLORING GILMER's IMPACT AND LEGACY
ROBERTO L. CORRADA*
I agree with most of the comments and arguments posited by Katherine
Stone in her essay in this Symposium issue.' I agree, for example, that the
trend in labor law to foreclose union members' common law suits under an
expansive view of section 301 preemption has the effect of forcing their
claims to be judged in a private, not public, hearing. The trend in employment
law to shift civil rights claims from public courts to private arbitrations is
certainly a similar phenomenon. I also agree that these trends are somewhat
insidious in that they mean there is, by virtue of fewer procedural safeguards,
a lesser chance on the whole that workers will prevail in their claims. As a
result, I also conclude that the trend toward privatization in labor and employ-
ment law tends to greatly benefit management, and hence, not surprisingly, is
a trend embraced by the conservative right in this country.
Perhaps if there is any strong point of disagreement between Katherine
Stone and me it relates to the approach each of us recommends given the
current state of affairs. Katherine Stone urges the enactment of a law that
would both nullify the current expansive view of section 301 preemption and
reaffirm or broaden the Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion of employment
contracts.2 Her decidedly public/legislative approach would purportedly allow
all workers to vindicate their civil rights and common law claims in a court of
law.
Stone's proposed reform would possibly allow more court access to some
unionized and white collar workers than would be the case in the present sys-
tem, but is it true that most workers will be better off as a result? I do not be-
lieve so, and thus advocate a different approach that embraces the privatization
of worker rights and legal claims. The fact that I advocate privatization does
not place me in the conservative camp, however. I believe that the left can lay
* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., George Washington
University, 1982; J.D., Catholic University School of Law, 1985. 1 would like to thank all of the
participants in the New Private Law Symposium. In particular, I would like to thank Katherine
Stone for her continuing outstanding contributions to a better understanding of dispute resolution
in the labor and employment arena, and Dennis Lynch for the depth of his insights regarding the
impact of process on the quality of justice. In addition, I would like to thank Alan Chen, Ed
Dauer, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Martha Ertman for taking the extra time to read drafts of this par-
ticular essay. Thanks also to the Hughes Research Fund for its continuing support of these sympo-
sia and to Sue Chrisman, Tracy Craige, and Tarek Younes, without whose tireless efforts on be-
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1. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
2. Id. at 1049-50.
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claim to the private sphere with a progressive agenda and transform that
sphere for the betterment of workers. To demonstrate my point, let us recon-
sider Katherine Stone's hypothetical case. The hypothetical highlights the
unsavory prospect of private arbitration for a retail store salesperson who is
injured on the job and is compelled to take her Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) claim to a presumably biased panel composed of retired industry
executives. Stone concludes that if the employee proceeds to court, her claim
will be dismissed.'
An unstated but implied assumption made by Professor Stone is that the
retail salesperson could proceed to court on her ADA claim. This may not, in
fact, be the case. Whether the salesperson will actually be able to bring a law-
suit will depend on a variety of other facts not mentioned in the hypothetical.
The salesperson may have difficulty finding a lawyer to represent her unless
she lives in an area with an active plaintiff's employment bar. Law has be-
come increasingly specialized, and in many areas of the country there is still a
decided lack of skilled plaintiff's side employment law practitioners. Next, a
lawyer may not take her case unless the remedy she stands to receive is at
least somewhat substantial. This would be true even if the attorney would be
entitled to attorneys' fees, because the opportunity cost of foregoing another
case with larger backpay potential may simply be too great. Since the hypo-
thetical plaintiff is a retail salesperson who has been out of her job for only a
short time, it is probably true that her backpay damages are not significant.
Representation would thus probably rest on her ability to claim compensatory
and punitive damages. There are not enough' facts in the hypothetical case to
determine whether there are any compensatory damages (emotional distress,
physical injury, etc.). Punitive damages are rarely assessed, and, of course,
they are capped. Moreover, given the vagaries of the jury trial system,
plaintiff's attorneys rarely decide to take cases based solely on the potential
availability of punitive damages.
Even if the salesperson succeeds in finding legal representation, she will
probably be asked to come up with a retainer of some $5,000.00 or upwards
to be used against costs incurred in litigation, for which she is ultimately re-
sponsible. If her case is exceptional, she may be able to convince her attorney
to advance the costs of litigation, but she will bear the risk with respect to a
loss of those monies in case she does not prevail. Even then, the attorney may
not advance the costs unless she enters into a much less attractive contingent
fee arrangement. All of this, of course, assumes that the salesperson acts rela-
tively quickly in speaking with an attorney within 300 days of the adverse
action by her employer. If she waits too long, her case will be barred by the
relevant statute of limitations. The truth is that the mere availability of a legal
3. Id. at 1018. It should be noted here that although federal courts seem to be reading
Gilmer expansively, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would apply the case's holding to
Professor Stone's hypothetical salesperson since it has been suggested that what the Court was
willing to hold with respect to a relatively sophisticated worker, like the broker before the Court
in Gilmer, it may not be willing to extend to someone like a retail store salesperson. See generally
Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A Major Step Forward for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?, 7 LAB. L.J. 823 (1991).
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cause of action does not necessarily result in an ultimate vindication of the
claim in court.
The hypothetical salesperson may ultimately be better off in a private
system that provides specific notice to her about any possible claim and time
limitations along with affording her the choice of bringing her case with or
without an attorney as a representative. Moreover, many of the due process
problems highlighted by'Stone and characterized by current employer arbitral
processes are not inherent features of those systems. And even though I also
admit that the employer has considerable leverage over employees with respect
to employment contracts, making them contracts of adhesion, I believe there
are other institutional actors (such as the American Bar Association) who can
affect that relationship and temper employer inclinations toward one-sided
accords. This essay will argue, then, that more justice might be achieved for
more people if the left decides to work with privatization in a progressive way
rather than fight it in favor of public processes that may be less efficient vehi-
cles for the delivery of legal services.
The Supreme Court's Decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
The Gilmer case holding and its facts have been rehashed countless times,
so let me recount here only the essentials. In Gilmer, a stockbroker was re-
quired by his employer to register as a securities representative with the New
York Stock Exchange.5 His registration application included an agreement to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of his employment or termination of employ-
ment.6 When Gilmer's employment was terminated, he sued under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' The district court denied the
employer's motion to compel arbitration, but was reversed by the court of
appeals whose decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
Fundamentally at odds in the Gilmer case were an earlier Supreme Court
decision securing the right of plaintiffs in statutory civil rights suits to go to
court regardless of a contractual agreement to arbitrate' and a string of other
Supreme Court decisions upholding contractual agreements to arbitrate under
the mantle of public policy surrounding the Federal Arbitration Act.9 Both
parties had good arguments, and it seems that Gilmer is one of those cases
that could have been decided either way. Gilmer himself should have felt
secure in his argument that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Gardner-
Denver was well on point. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that an
employee could proceed to court on a statutory civil rights claim (Title VII)
despite an agreement between an employer and his union requiring arbitration
4. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
5. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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of such claims. If anything, Gilmer's case was more compelling since the em-
ployee in Gardner-Denver had his rights waived by his union, an institutional
actor not easily cowed by an employer. Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act
contains an express statutory exemption for contracts of employment.'"
On the other side, the employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., may well
have found the Supreme Court's trend in favor of arbitration quite compelling.
After all, the Supreme Court had favored arbitration in cases involving statuto-
ry rights under laws as imbued with public policy concerns as the Sherman
Act, the Securities Acts, and even the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO)." The employer may also have felt that its case, in-
volving the securities industry and a relatively sophisticated employee, present-
ed the ideal facts for Supreme Court extension of its arbitration precedents
into the employment law arena.
The Supreme Court agreed that arbitration should have been compelled in
Gilmer's case, and it did so on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act's liber-
al policy in favor of arbitration. In doing so, the Court distinguished the
Gardner-Denver case primarily by maintaining that it had not presented the
issue regarding arbitration of statutory rights. Rather, the Court held that
Gardner-Denver involved whether the consideration of contract rights parallel-
ing statutory rights (since the plaintiff's claim of discrimination was primarily
based on anti-discrimination language in the collective bargaining agreement)
can serve as a basis for precluding judicial vindication of statutory rights.'
2
With respect to the Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion for employment con-
tracts, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue by refusing to find that
Gilmer's agreement with the New York Stock Exchange was an employment
agreement, leaving the issue "for another day."'3
The Gilmer decision poses two interesting questions regarding what we
might call the New Private Law. First, can we say that the decision represents
some sort of shift to private law that stands as a bellwether for the private law
movement? Second, if it does, is this shift a conservative one that stands to
have a strong impact on public law and the political left generally? With re-
spect to the first question, I believe it does signal a substantial shift to the pri-
vate sphere which may be indicative of a new movement. With respect to the
second question, I do not believe that the shift necessarily means that the right
has scored a victory. The New Private Law, in my mind, does not inherently
10. Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). For a discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the employment contract exemption, see Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts"
Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Classification, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
12. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. The Court also distinguished Gardner-Denver on the grounds
that it involved a collective bargaining agreement, raising the tension between individual and
collective rights, and that the case had not been decided under the Federal Arbitration Act (sug-
gesting Gardner-Denver might be decided differently today). Id. at 35.
13. Id. at 25 n.2.
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carry with it some sort of political valence--either right or left. I will suggest,
in fact, that the time is ripe for this shift to be captured and occupied by the
progressive left.
Gilmer's Impact: Signalling a Shift to Private Law in the Employment Arena
It is my contention that there is evidence of a New Private Law shift in
the employment and labor law arena. I believe that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gilmer and its later opinion in Lechmere signal such a shift, not mere-
ly by their substantive pronouncements in favor of that which is private, but
also by the analytical mode within which the substantive decisionmaking un-
folds. A useful framework for determining whether in fact there is something
that could be characterized as New Private Law is suggested by the comments
made some years ago by Peter Shane in a Symposium on the New Public
Law. 4 Shane posited an approach that requires a parsing of the phrase "New
Private Law." We should ask first whether we can say that it is, in fact,
"new," then whether it is "private," and finally whether it is "law."
To decide whether New Private Law is "new," "we must identify some
past moment in time as an appropriate baseline for comparison, and somehow
construct a portrait of [private] law as it then existed."'5 Our "private" law,
however, would only be new if its features reveal a "theory of the state differ-
ent from the theory of the state most plausibly attributed to the [private] law
of our baseline time.' 6 "Theory of the state" is taken to mean "a widespread
understanding of the relationship of the state to its citizens, of official institu-
tions to one another, or of the core purposes of government activity."' 7 Final-
ly, newness must be understood on a relatively broad level, incorporating
different perspectives. If what is purportedly new is only new through a very
particularized or contextualized perspective, then it should not necessarily be
proclaimed as new on a grander scale. 8
Let me dispense with the final requirement quickly. I do not, in this essay,
purport to be saying that there is an entire legal shift to a private regime (al-
though some of my arguments do indeed support this). Rather, I am merely
making the claim in the context of employment and labor law. With respect to
a baseline, to the extent that it is generally agreed that the rise of the regulato-
ry state has ushered in a regime of public law, 9 then such a regime could be
the baseline that we would use in noting any shift to private law. If indeed
there is a shift to private law, which would contain features substantially dif-
ferent from what we know as public law, then we can conclude that this is
14. See generally Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991); see also
Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law"
If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 837, 838-42 (1991).
15. See Shane, supra note 14, at 838.
16. Id. at 840.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 840-41.
19. See generally Symposium, The New Public Law, supra note 14; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Ref-
erence to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 596-604 (1990).
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"new." Hence, because I am arguing that what is new is "private" and the
current regime is public, I have less work to do than the authors in the "New
Public Law" who were attempting to show (at least according to Shane's char-
acterization) that there was something new about "public" law, the then-exist-
ing regime. If all this is correct then I will have revealed a "new" private law
if I only show that there is a private shift from public law.
Some might maintain, however, that if a regime of "private" law was ever
prevalent in some past era, I have not shown newness unless I distinguish this
current private law from that which existed before. To these, I would say that
even a mere return to private law is necessarily new because it must be under-
stood in the context of its public law predecessor. However, I believe that the
New Private Law has a facet that makes it different from the old private law,
and will therefore argue newness on the merits.
If there was an "old" private law regime in the United States, it would be
the one safeguarded by common law formalists who regarded the private
sphere as primary and who distinctly favored private property rights."0 This
regime was characterized by a suspicion toward government regulation, but at
the same time relied upon a decidedly public institution-the court of law-to
ensure the protection of property rights and the enforcement of "private"
agreements.' It is with respect to this characteristic that the "new" private
law differs. The New Private Law, as evidenced by the decision in Gilmer, ex-
pressly mistrusts public fora and seeks to enforce private law in private ven-
ues. Although it retains an inherent characteristic of the old private law-a
fondness for private property rights and for enforcement of private consensual
arrangements-it also seeks to have those rights and contracts enforced by
private means. Indeed, vis A vis this new movement, the old private law might
be considered only a milder form of public law.2" This same analysis reveals
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 711-12 (1991).
21. Id. at 712.
22. Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 875, 884-88 (1991). Of course,
one could find a baseline for "private" law that might argue against the newness of the latest pri-
vate law shift. For example, there was a time, before English common law courts became inter-
ested in enforcing private contracts, when contracts were created and enforced by parties other
than the state. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CorrRACTS 12-20 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
rise of contract through the ecclesiastical and merchant courts and the ultimate wresting away of
contract law jurisdiction by the King's common law courts). As one writer has noted, in language
eerily similar to some of the language contained in Gilmer, "It is not the custom of the court of
the lord king to protect private agreements, nor does it even concern itself with such contracts as
can be considered to be like private agreements." Id. at 13 (citing R. de Glanville, Treatise on the
Laws and Customs of the Realm of England, bk. 10, ch. 18 (G. Hall ed., 1965)).
The current shift to private law, however, would be new vis A vis this baseline as well. The
law being applied in private fora today is decidedly public law enacted by the legislature. Gilmer
expressly allows private decisionmakers to decide issues involving public rights, but only if the
private parties have consensually agreed to such an arrangement in advance. By contrast, private
law enforced in ecclesiastical or commercial courts was developed in those courts by church offi-
cials and merchants. In addition, there is certainly something new in the state's giving up jurisdic-
tion (as is the case in a Gilmer regime) versus its acquisition of jurisdiction (as was the case when
the King's common law courts encroached on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and commercial
courts).
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a "theory of the state" that is different from prior baseline theories of the state.
Certainly any emphasis on private rights, and especially on private dispute
resolution mechanisms, necessarily suggests a less republican view of the state
versus the individual. Whereas a regime of public law emphasizes public dis-
course (whether it be in the courts or in the legislature) and public policy,
private law seeks to leave matters to be decided by private parties and within
private institutions, preferably with no public discussion and devoid of public
influence. This new private theory of the state differs also from common law
formalism ("the old private law") in that it sees no role for the state in enforc-
ing private agreements: it is not that these are matters for common law courts
rather than legislatures, it is simply that the state shall not be involved in these
matters at all. Therefore, the shift indeed seems to be "new."
Next, consider whether this shift can be called "private." Many have writ-
ten about the public/private distinction in law.23 Most of these have found the
problem of what is public and what is private to be quite intractable. Consider,
for example, in labor law literature, Karl Klare's article, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law.24 Klare demonstrates the incoherence of the pub-
lic/private distinction in labor law by showing the inconsistency of the use of
public and private designations to describe similar phenomena, how
policymakers use public and private labels to arrive at sharply contrasting or
even contradictory legal conclusions, and how the borderline between public
and private is constantly being altered and redefined despite the absence of
significant changes in the underlying phenomena or social forces that are de-
scribed by public and private labels.2" As a result, Klare concludes that the
public/private distinction poses as an analytical tool, but "functions more as a
form of political rhetoric used to justify particular results."26 In this Sympo-
sium, Alan Chen also strongly maintains that there is virtually no real distinc-
tion between the public and the private given that the private realm's jurisdic-
tion depends exclusively on the whim of the public sphere.27 Moreover,
according to Chen, even a descriptive shift that we might label "private" has
no jurisprudential significance since it is likely to be subsumed, defined, and
explained by jurisprudential movements that already exist and carry their own
truly independent weight.28
Indeed, much of what has been written regarding the incoherence of the
public/private distinction has questioned the notion that "private law" is truly
private. For example, Karl Klare questions the labeling of an employment
contract as a private agreement given the growing number of states forbidding
23. Legal Realists, Critical Legal Scholars, and Neo-Republicans have successfully attacked
the prior line of distinction between private law and public law. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
22, at 886 (collecting authority).
24. Karl E. Klare, The PubliclPrivate Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358
(1982).
25. Id. at 1360.
26. Id. at 1361.
27. See Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1253, 1257-65
(1996).
28. Id. at 1253-55, 1259-67.
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the discharge of an employee for a reason that contravenes public policy.29
He points out that "[plublic law norms are implied into the relationship as
restrictions upon the employer's power to discharge."3 The same might be
said of the "private" collective bargaining agreement. The original Wagner Act
embodied the notion that labor law problems would be resolved by a private
process of negotiation.3 Although this private process was created and main-
tained by the enactment of public law, "the mission of public law was narrow-
ly limited to the task of establishing and maintaining an effective private bar-
gaining system."32 Despite this, however, postwar interpretation of labor law
provisions governing collective bargaining agreements has been characterized
by a "pronounced drift toward public expansionism."33 This public drift is
seen in increased legal regulation of collective bargaining negotiations, the
expanded judicial role in administering the labor contract, and increased statu-
tory regulation of the employment relationship.34 The collective bargaining
agreement today is indeed controlled as much (if not more) by the state as it is
by the private parties who breathe life into it in the first instance. It is fair to
conclude that the so-called "private" labor contract is part of an integral web
of state control over the bargaining relationship.
The longstanding critique of the public/private distinction has been suc-
cessful because what has occurred with respect to the distinction in labor and
employment law development has been replicated in the development of other
areas of law. And that critique has shown that to date, the "private law" label
has been misapplied to common law. As a result, the "public law" sphere is
dominant and in fact encompasses all governmental institutions-the legisla-
ture, the courts, and the executive. Those scholars writing about the "New
Public Law" in 1991 by and large sought to describe the trend away from the
exclusive study of courts and court decisions in law to the study also of the
legislature and the executive and their role in making law through the enact-
ment and enforcement of statutes.33 Even Peller and Eskridge in their article
about New Public Law concede that the New Public Law occupies much
broader ground than initially suggested by the Legal Realists or even Legal
Process Theorists. In describing the New Public Law as: (1) normative, (2)
formative, destructive, and transformative, and (3) dialogical practical reason-
ing,36 Peller and Eskridge define a dynamic system of interaction that we
might call "law" today. Describing "law" so broadly allows Peller and
Eskridge to sweep all legal movements in this century into their "New Public
Law" schema, but at the expense, perhaps, of defining any "private" sphere
entirely out of existence.
29. Klare, supra note 24, at 1362.
30. Id. at 1363.
31. Id. at 1390; see Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND.
L.J. 319, 322 (1951).
32. Klare, supra note 24, at 1391.
33. Id. at 1395.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 888-905.
36.' See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 20, at 746.
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However, an analysis of the "New Public Law" scholarship does reveal
that despite the apparent breadth of public law today, there may exist a funda-
mental limiting principle that gives credence to the view that the Gilmer deci-
sion represents a true "private" law shift. It would appear that public law, and
even the "New Public Law," is somehow situated within what we would call
the public sphere. "Public sphere," however, should be viewed very broadly
today based on the critique of the public/private distinction: it includes not just
the judiciary, but also the legislature and the executive. Beyond the formal
branches of government, the public sphere might also include institutions that
have an impact on these branches-i.e., lobbyists, the media, and even private
institutions somehow involved with the public trust. Today, the Internet, be-
cause of its easy public accessibility, might be a mechanism that we would
include in an expanded and fluid definition of the public sphere.
The argument can be made that the New Private Law seeks to exist
outside of the public sphere. If so, the Gilmer decision, extended in all the
horrible ways suggested by Katherine Stone, could establish an entirely differ-
ent paradigm of employment law: a paradigm we would be hard-pressed to
call "public." This may be true even if New Private Law fails to exist entirely
outside the public sphere. If, in fact, private companies take it upon them-
selves to enter into contracts with employees requiring private arbitration of
public law claims and with no hope for judicial review, then the Gilmer deci-
sion will have welcomed an extraction from the public sphere. Especially if
one feature of these private arbitrations is the lack of written opinions, law
will be created and re-created without, in any tangible way, affecting the
public discourse. Although the public sphere may act upon the private
decisionmaking process, there will be no popular mechanism to ensure that the
private process acts endogenously upon the public.
It seems to me that a vision of law which seeks to divest itself from the
state in particular and the public sphere in general is something new and also
something uniquely "private." Moreover, the fact that the state could recapture
this jurisdiction at any time does not necessarily mean that the law created in
individual private institutions for individual consumption and influence is a
creature of the state. Thus, what Gilmer portends-an infinite number and
kind of individual justice mechanisms within private institutions--cannot be
said to fall within the generalized rubric of the "New Public Law" because it
does not intend to be a player in public discourse. Individual systems of
private justice, whatever they may be, are not systems that generally contribute
to political dialogue or public deliberation.37 They do not, by virtue of their
decisions or results, have "a major impact on the implementation of public
policy or collective interests."3 Nor do they, on a day-to-day basis, require
37. Id. at 732-37, 744-45, 750, 752-55, 758-61. Peller and Eskridge implicitly support this
idea as well in that, in seeking to define "New Public Law," they necessarily choose two judicial
decisions in order to contextualize their discussion. In this sense, they have chosen the quintessen-
tial vehicle of public law (the published judicial decision) to make their point-the very vehicle
that is circumvented in the Gilmer-led private law regime.
38. See Shane, supra note 14, at 842 (defining "public" law).
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an understanding of political institutions or the framing of issues relating to
the proper role of government.
39
Perhaps a more interesting question than whether New Private Law is new
or private is whether it is law at all. If New Private Law lives in hiding, seeks
no public identity, and has no public essence, then, quite possibly, it may not
be law. Peter Shane has defined law broadly as "webs of institutions and prac-
tices through which a society represents to itself its shared understandings of
right or wrong . . . . .. o In the New Private Law of employment, each indi-
vidual justice system will ultimately develop its own code of right and wrong
through a series of self-contained, institutional arbitral decisions. One might
argue that these ultimately will not constitute a "shared understanding" of right
and wrong. However, there are certain inherent features of the New Private
Law in the employment arena that raise it to the level of "shared understand-
ing" without converting it into "public" law. First, these individual systems of
justice will be interpreting public law texts. The Gilmer case will, if viewed
expansively, allow private arbitral tribunals to decide statutory rights. Although
these rights will necessarily be transformed into different sets of understand-
ings by isolated fora, they nevertheless must begin with the same textual lan-
guage, and, to some extent, will be guided by public law decisions relating to
such texts. Moreover, appeals to "public" courts of fringe arbitral decisions
reaching absurd results should ensure that some general "shared" boundary
will be maintained regarding private interpretation of public law. Next, at least
in terms of impact, some private arbitral systems will serve communities much
larger than many small towns served currently by public courts. For example,
a private justice system implemented by General Motors or Exxon will typi-
cally yield a "shared understanding" of employment law that is more widely
held than that yielded by a local trial court decision from Basalt, Colorado.
We can conclude that New Private Law is indeed law, though it may stretch
the definition.
To lend further support to the emergence of New Private Law, Gilmer's
style of analysis strongly suggests such a trend. Although the Gilmer decision
opens substantive and procedural doors to the New Private Law, it is not
merely these opened doors that make the decision noteworthy. The decision
may also close a door. The analytical mode of the opinion (the way in which
the Supreme Court actually goes about announcing and rendering its substan-
tive decision on the merits) suggests a possible Supreme Court inclination
toward ignoring-maybe even erasing-what was so comforting for the left
about past civil rights decisions involving discrimination laws. If this is true,
39. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 887. Farber and Frickey do, however, consider
that the New Public Law might be implicated when "the interpretation of a governmental act is at
stake." Id. To the extent that private arbitration systems within companies will be seeking to apply
public law, the argument may be made that these systems fall within public law and certainly the
public sphere. But that is true in only the most formalistic sense of public law. Without judicial
review (or some other mechanism of public discourse), the public text of a statute can easily lose
its "public" character. By interpretation, the text is easily rendered a creature of the private pro-
cess. Thus, "interpretation of a governmental act" is to the private arbitration process what
"sound" is to the tree that falls in the woods with nobody around to hear it.
40. See Shane, supra note 14, at 841.
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then those like Professor Stone who would argue for a legislative reversal of
Gilmer should be more careful about what they ask.
As I will show below, the analytical mode of the Gilmer opinion striking-
ly deviates from prior Court analysis of civil rights decisions that invoke pub-
lic law principles. In general, the decision favors a formalistic, superficial
analysis that typifies the manner in which a court might interpret a contract
between two parties rather than the more in-depth, less formal analysis the
Court has employed when invoking public law concerns surrounding civil
fights laws.4 Although this may at first seem appropriate given that a con-
tract, after all, was at the heart of Gilmer, the Court has in the past rejected
the easy contract-type analysis when a matter of public law was also involved.
The best example of this contrast is seen in a comparison of Gilmer and the
Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 2 The fundamen-
tal issue in Gardner-Denver, as in Gilmer, was whether a "private" contract
providing for arbitration of a civil rights dispute could be used to prevent a
plaintiff from having the dispute heard by a court.43
Relying heavily upon legislative history, the Gardner-Denver decision
begins by focusing on the procedures of Title VII and the public policy behind
the statutory enactment. The Court cites to Congress's statement that the poli-
cy against discrimination is the "highest priority" in discussing the importance
of alternative fora for bringing discrimination claims' and emphasizes legis-
lative history manifesting an intent to allow individuals to independently pur-
sue claims under Title VII and other applicable federal and state laws.45
Finally, in justifying its decision that individuals may go to court despite arbi-
tration over the same issue, the Court relies on the difference between arbitra-
tion and the judicial forum, critically highlighting public policy and meaning-
ful differences between the two processes. For example, the Court states, "The
purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal
courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to
arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal."'
41. Martha Ertman argues that courts' general and superficial approach to contracts (as op-
posed to statutory cases) has benefitted marginalized minorities in our society, and thus she views
any trend toward contract-type analysis as positive. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Contractual
Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107
(1996). 1 would simply note that whether the trend is normatively good or bad depends upon
whether one is in a statutorily protected class. Those whose civil rights are protected by public
law would probably prefer continuation of that protection in the public arena. Ertman shockingly
points out that a trend toward contract and away from legislative protection may lead ultimately to
outright prohibition-and perhaps the affi-mative action debate is an early indicator that anti-dis-
crimination protections are indeed headed in a direction toward prohibition and away from legisla-
tive protection.
42. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
43. Certainly there are notable differences between the two cases: Gardner-Denver involved
a labor contract which did not require the arbitrator to apply public law (the contract had language
mirroring Title VII), while Gilmer involved a commercial agreement requiring an arbitrator to
actually interpret ADEA statutory language. These differences, however, do not negate the similar-
ity of the fundamental issue in both disputes-to what extent can private arbitration of a civil
rights dispute substitute for a judicial hearing and determination of the same issue?
44. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47.
45. Id. at 48 & n.9.
46. Id. at 56.
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The Court expressly recognizes the marked differences between private
and public processes. According to the Court, the role of the arbitrator, to
effectuate the intent of the parties, may be inconsistent with the goals of the
statute. Moreover, while arbitrators are expected to know the particular parties
and make decisions with that in mind, "the resolution of statutory or constitu-
tional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has
proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language
frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."'47
The Court goes on to explain other incongruities, including differences in the
way proceedings are recorded, the rules of evidence, and differences in proce-
dural rights like discovery, compulsory process, cross examination, and testi-
mony under oath.' The Court states that "it is the informality of arbitral pro-
cedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitra-
tion a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the
federal courts."'49
The Court finally suggests that courts may nonetheless give weight to
arbitral decisions in deciding Title VII claims, and the Court acknowledges
that the weight accorded might even be substantial if the arbitral process re-
flects procedures used in court.50 The Court concludes, however, that "courts
should be ever mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it neces-
sary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory
employment claims. It is the duty of the courts to assure the full availability of
this forum."'"
By contrast, the Gilmer Court not only reaches a different result, but does
so by perfunctorily comparing and dismissing any differences between arbitral
and judicial fora. 2 In Gilmer, the Court begins with an exposition lasting
several pages on case law involving the Federal Arbitration Act. 3 After intro-
ducing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in only one gen-
eral paragraph, the Court, with no analysis, concludes that broader social pol-
icies can be pursued through both arbitral and judicial resolution mecha-
nisms. " The Court sloughs off a concern that encouraging arbitration will
undermine the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) role in
enforcing the ADEA by maintaining merely that nothing in the ADEA pre-
cludes arbitration.5 Rather than compare arbitral and judicial structures vis A
vis the ADEA, the Court states simply that because the EEOC may receive
47. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 57-58.
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 60 n.21.
51. Id.
52. 1 am not the first to point out the superficial nature of the Court's comparisons in
Gilmer. See Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 203 (1992); Martin H. Malin,
Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77
(1996).
53. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-27.
54. Id. at 27-28.
55. Id. at 28-29.
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information from "any source" and because the agency is itself directed to
pursue "informal methods of conciliation," arbitration is consistent with the
ADEA's statutory scheme. 6
Regarding the adequacy of arbitral procedures compared to judicial safe-
guards, the Court states that general attacks on arbitration are "far out of step
with our current strong endorsement" of arbitration. 7 As a result, the Court,
almost apologetically, reveals that it intends to "address these arguments only
briefly." 8 And, indeed, the Court's dismissal of the procedural arguments is
brief. Noting the possibility of biased arbitration panels, the Court quickly
states that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules allow the parties to
receive information on the arbitrators and that courts may overturn decisions
in which there was "evident partiality or corruption."59 While the Court con-
cedes that there are more ample discovery rules in a judicial forum, it states
that limited discovery in arbitration is the tradeoff for the "simplicity, infor-
mality, and expedition of arbitration."'  The Court makes this point as if
ADEA plaintiffs would somehow desire these as much as the employers who
institute the procedures. More disturbing, however, is the Court's cite to a
decision involving an arbitration agreement between two commercial entities.
The Court implicitly suggests that it sees no difference between individuals
filing civil rights suits and commercial entities pursuing contract or antitrust
claims. With respect to the fact that arbitrators need not file written opinions,
the Court refuses to recognize a distinction between judicial opinions and
arbitrators' pronouncements by stating that the NYSE rules require an arbitral
writing that includes the name of the parties, a summary of issues, and a
description of the award.6
Finally, with respect to the most important argument in Gilmer, that there
is often unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, the
Court stated that mere inequality is not sufficient to hold that arbitration agree-
ments are per se unenforceable in the employment context. Here, the Court
suggests a limiting rule for its decision that harkens back to the days of the
Gardner-Denver case, but it then undermines this by comparing the employ-
ee/employer relationship to that of securities dealer/investor. The Court reveals
its unwillingness to entertain inequality arguments when it concludes that there
was no indication in the case that Gilmer was "coerced or defrauded" into
agreeing to arbitration.62
56. Id.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. It is interesting to note how the Court dismisses as general attacks on arbitration, the
very same attacks that it not only entertained, but substantially endorsed, in the Gardner-Denver
decision.
59. Id. The Court concludes, as if recognizing that its arguments are specious, that "[t]here
has been no showing in this case that [the NYSE] provisions are inadequate to guard against po-
tential bias." Id. at 31.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 32. Again, the Court seems to sheepishly recognize the lack of force behind its ar-
gument by adding that despite its decision, ADEA claims will continue to be filed in courts of
law. Id.
62. Id. at 33.
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The Gilmer Court's unwillingness to entertain arguments about the defi-
ciencies of arbitration compared to judicial resolution of civil rights claims
cannot bode well for those who would seek merely to reverse Gilmer in the
hopes that the Court (and federal courts in general) will decide civil rights
cases as it did in the past, in a manner imbued with the public trust and en-
crusted with concerns about public policy. The starkest evidence that the Court
is unlikely to decide civil rights cases the same way, however, is revealed by
two more important indicators: first, the Court's radically different view of the
public forum in Gilmer as compared to its view in Gardner-Denver; and sec-
ond, and most importantly, the Court's abject refusal to view employees as a
class as somehow different from investors or car dealers when it comes to
negotiation of contracts. The Court's myopia with respect to a distinction that
cuts to the very raison d'etre of civil rights statutes is a strong indicator that
the times they are a changin'.
A slightly weaker trend toward a New Private Law can also be seen in
labor relations law (the law of union and management relations). This trend is
manifested in two ways, one procedural and one substantive: first, the expan-
sion of the doctrine of preemption in the 1980s and 1990s (procedural), and,
second, the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,63 involving
union access rights to employer private property (substantive). Katherine Stone
does an excellent job of explaining the expansion of section 301 preemption
and its implications for unionized workers' common law employment
claims.' This expansion, which forces unionized workers to take common
law claims to labor arbitrators and by and large prevents judicial resolution of
those claims, reflects a Supreme Court preference for private arbitration sys-
tems over public fora. It is a weaker private law trend than the one represent-
ed by Gilmer, however, because the labor contract has become a creature of
the state, and there has been a drift toward importing public ideals and con-
trols into the labor arbitration process. Still, the labor arbitration process is
much less public than judicial resolution of claims in court. Thus, the Supreme
Court's increasing preference for private ordering in the unionized context
(measured by the expansion of section 301 preemption) reflects a trend toward
private law that is at least equal to the private ordering preferences of old
common law formalism with some features of the New Private Law (requiring
resolution of "public law" claims in private fora).
The other indicator of a trend toward private law in the labor arena is the
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lechmere, which, incidentally was issued
only some eight months after Gilmer. In Lechmere, the Court was asked to
determine whether it was an unfair labor practice for a private employer to bar
nonemployee union organizers from its property. In holding that it was not an
unfair labor practice, the Court tilted substantially in favor of private property
rights over public law guarantees of employee access to information about
organizing.65 In deciding Lechmere, the Court expressly rejected the highly
63. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
64. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1022-30.
65. See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of
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nuanced, decidedly New Public Law approach that the NLRB had taken to the
issue of nonemployee union access to private property.' The Board's ap-
proach had been developed over a course of decades with guidance from the
Supreme Court in three union access cases. 67 The approach relied on the
weighing of a multiplicity of variables that would help the NLRB to determine
a "locus of accommodation" between employers' private property rights and
employees' NLRA section 7 rights. The Board's own description of the analy-
sis used reflected its "New Public Law" grounding. According to the Board,
"As with other legal questions involving multiple factors, the 'nature of the
problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an
evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula
as a comprehensive answer."' In rejecting the Board's complicated approach
that attempted to equate private law and public law rights, the Court stated:
To say that our cases require accommodation between employees'
and employers' rights is a true but incomplete statement, for the cases
also go far in establishing the locus of that accommodation where
nonemployee organizing is at issue. So long as nonemployee union
organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an
employer's property, the requisite accommodation has taken place. It
is only where such access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and
proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a second level.'
The Court's application of its understanding that private property rights should
be ascendant to employee section 7 rights was revealed in its discussion of the
actual case. The Court explained that despite insurmountable access problems
encountered by the union in Lechmere, "[aiccess to employees, not success in
winning them over, is the critical issue," and "the union in this case failed to
establish the existence of any 'unique obstacles' ... that frustrated access to
Lechmere's employees. 70
The Court's decision in Lechmere certainly seems to be a throwback to
old common law formalism due to its enhanced view of private property inter-
ests. To the extent that the decision also rejects the NLRB's "New Public
Law" approach to the question of nonemployee access to private property, it
also represents a closing door similar to the one in Gilmer.
Gilmer's Legacy: The Seeds of Co-Optation by the Left
Whether or not Gilmer signals some sort of New Private Law movement,
its legacy-shifting public law civil rights cases into private dispute mecha-
nisms-will have a profound impact on employment law. Certainly what
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1991).
66. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538; see also Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
67. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539
(1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
68. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14 (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961)).
69. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 540-41.
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Gilmer may allow should be of large concern to the left-in general and to the
civil rights community in particular. In the past, there has been a marked dif-
ference in the quality of justice meted out in public courts and private arbi-
trations. Katherine Stone does a good job of quantifying these differences.7'
As a result of these differences, Stone maintains that legislators should act to
ensure that all public statutory rights claims be decided in courts.7
I maintain, however, that, despite these historical differences between
private and public processes, civil rights advocates should not opt for the old
public law route so quickly. The analysis of Lechmere and Gilmer in the prior
section reveals the Court's growing inclination against interpreting civil rights
laws broadly in the public interest as it once did. And this should come as no
real surprise given the absence from the Court of noted civil rights champions
such as Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan. But this shift in Court anal-
ysis and approach is not as important an argument for proceeding with caution
as is the fact that Gilmer, despite its shortcomings, has served as an impetus
of sorts for the transformation of private processes by various private-actors to
erase some of the meaningful differences that have separated public from pri-
vate fora for so long. If this transformation continues, the prospects for equal
justice in private arbitration processes is improved with a corresponding in-
crease in the possibility of justice.
Before discussing transformative efforts, a brief recap of the traditional
problems with private arbitration in the employment setting is in order.
Katherine Stone rightfully points out the primary hazard of allowing employ-
ment agreements in the nonunion setting.73 These agreements are often bla-
tant "contracts of adhesion" which have been required of new employees on a
"take it or leave it" basis without affording employees proper notice regarding
waiver of a public venue for their claims.74 Moreover, these arbitration pro-
cesses have been characterized by systematic deficiencies that tend to favor
employers, not the least of which is a biased decisionmaker who generally
tends to be a retired industry executive.75
Since the Gilmer decision, however, a number of private organizations
have attempted to draft and implement procedures that address a number of
concerns regarding arbitration of employment disputes. Moreover, these groups
have by and large attempted to incorporate due process requirements from
public dispute resolution mechanisms in an attempt to make private arbitra-
tions fairer. For example, the Center for Public Resources (CPR) has drafted a
process that requires an arbitrator selected from an arbitration panel of the
American Arbitration Association.76 In addition, the CPR process provides for
71. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1036-43; see also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-60.
72. Stone, supra note 1, at 1046-50.
73. See generally id. at 1036-41, 1046-49.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1040-41; see also CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TER-
MINATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE, in Jay W. Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Arbitration
and ADR in the Employment Area, C879 ALI-ABA, MEDIATION AND OTHER ADR METHODS, 439
app. at 461 (Nov. 18, 1993) [hereinafter CPR PROCEDURES].
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backpay, attorneys' fees and costs, and reinstatement.77 If reinstatement is not
practicable, then an employee may be awarded "front pay. 7' Although puni-
tive and special damages are not allowed, an arbitrator may award up to one
year of wages in lieu of such an award.79
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has also released its Nation-
al Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes.0 The AAA's rules fol-
low the Due Process Protocol developed by a task force comprised of man-
agement, union, and arbitration representatives formed in response to an
American Bar Association (ABA) resolution to address employment arbitration
involving nonunion workers.8" Along with its rules, the AAA also announced
that it has assembled a roster of experienced employment arbitrators and medi-
ators to decide disputes and has instituted a national training program focusing
on substantive and procedural issues.8 2 The AAA rules provide that arbitra-
tors have the authority to order whatever discovery is necessary for "a full and
fair exploration of the disputed issues" and that they may grant any relief that
would be available in court, including attorneys' fees. 3 Important systematic
safeguards are also required by the rules, including: the right to representation,
the same burdens of proof as in court, and various requirements regarding
arbitrators to ensure neutrality. 4 The rules took effect on June 1, 1996 and
will be applied to "any arbitration agreement that provides for arbitration by
AAA or proceedings under its rules." 5 In addition, JAMS/Endispute, another
provider of ADR services, adopted similar fairness rules in January of 1995.6
Katherine Stone levels a substantial criticism at these processes that de-
spite their attempts to provide disclaimers to employees informing them of
their decision to elect a private forum for any disputes, employers' continuing
inclination to minimize any disclaimers by hiding them or placing them in fine
print will hopelessly serve to undermine the process. 7 Stone emphasizes
post-Gilmer case law that supports her point.8 8 However, Stone also discusses
cases in which courts of law or the parties themselves have refused to be
bound by mandatory arbitration agreements because of procedural irregularities
surrounding the formation of the contract.8 9 Moreover, courts have shown a
77. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1041; see also CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 76, at 475-76.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Arbitration: Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due Process Task Force




84. Id. Arbitrators must be mutually acceptable to both parties and drawn from a diverse and
nondiscriminatorily composed pool. Moreover, arbitrators must be experienced in employment
law, have no conflicts of interest, and must disclose all information affecting neutrality. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1037-39.
88. Id.; see, e.g., De Gaetano v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC), 1996 WL
44226 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189
(N.D. Tex. 1994); Lang v. Burlington Northern R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993); Pony
Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Stone, supra note 1, at 1041-42; see EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 67 Fair
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willingness to void arbitration agreements that drastically depart from the
substantive requirements of civil rights laws or the procedural rights afforded
in courts of law.' In fact, the courts' overall willingness to review the fair-
ness of private arbitral systems in the context of statutory civil rights claims
has led private ADR service companies to change their procedures. For exam-
ple, after the River Oaks Imaging case discussed by Stone,9' CPR upgraded
its disclaimer to provide better and more meaningful information to employees
in a "model memorandum to employees."'92 Moreover, the new policy ensures
that arbitration agreements do "not truncate statutes of limitation available
under statutory or common law."'93
Despite continuing concerns about private resolution of statutory civil
rights claims, it appears that a unique combination of the courts and the pri-
vate marketplace is working to ensure fairer procedures and more just results.
The adoption by AAA and JAMS/Endispute of policies that follow the Due
Process Protocol endorsed by the ABA indicates that private institutions can
work within themselves to ensure fair application of civil rights statutes in
private processes. Also, the willingness of CPR to respond to the market for
ADR services by making its procedures more fair means that employers will
not be able to institute arbitral processes with the help of expert ADR provid-
ers without incorporating notions of procedural and substantive fairness into
their systems. While these developments may seem precarious in the sense
that these private groups might change their approach, the fact that some of
these developments occurred roughly simultaneously with a threatened boycott
of ADR processes by the National Employment Law Association (plaintiffs'
employment lawyers) strongly suggests the developments may well be endur-
ing ones.94 Ultimately, too, as employers and ADR providers become more
knowledgeable about what courts will generally allow with respect to private
arbitration in this area, the courts will become much less relevant. If the trend
continues, it will become more efficient and direct for those who would seek
to change these processes to approach private institutions like -the ABA and
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Bentley's Luggage Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-
CA-16658 (Sept. 25, 1995); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
unenforceable an arbitration agreement limiting the authority of the arbitrator to award exemplary
damages or attorneys' fees as allowed by statute); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal.
1981); Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1004 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (voiding
an arbitration agreement allowing the employer alone to appoint the arbitration panel). Cf
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (upholding a punitive
damages award in arbitration, although partly because of the parties' contractual agreement to
provide for them). For a more complete discussion of these cases, see George W. Bohlander et al.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Policies: Current Procedural and Administrative Issues, 1996 LAB.
L.J. 619.
91. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1041; see also supra note 89.
92. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Center for Public Resources to Issue Model ADR
Policy for Employment Disputes, 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. 114 d1 I (BNA) (June 14, 1995).
93. Id. ("Although the change [regarding statutes of limitation] takes into account such re-
cent case law as EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic .... the committee's concern over
the model policy's varying substantive rules of law predated that decision .... ).
94. EDWARD A. DAUER, 2 MANUAL OF DisPurE RESOLUTION § 26.04, at 2S-58 (Supp.
1996); Thorn Weidlich, Storm Brews over ADR, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 6, 1995, at A6.
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private ADR companies like AAA and JAMS/Endispute. In the future, then,
the state may well be effectively divorced from this new private system of
law.
One might react to the above argument by asking whether it would simply
be better to seek to have statutory civil rights disputes remain in the courts
since the courts are more adept at instituting and enforcing the due process
notions that are so important in this area of law. In other words, if private
arbitration systems can at best hope to be pale imitations of the court system,
why not simply try to retain judicial handling of civil rights complaints? Of
course, the answer must be that transforming private arbitral systems has some
additional bonus for the progressive left that the court system cannot provide.
I can think of two substantial benefits to working for change in private arbitral
systems. The first harkens back to Katherine Stone's hypothetical involving
the retail salesperson plaintiff and my reaction to that hypothetical at the be-
ginning of this essay. Under the public law system, a potential plaintiff must
find a lawyer to represent him or her, typically for a fee. Plaintiffs who appear
to be poor witnesses, who have very little backpay damages because of low
paying jobs or mitigation efforts, or who simply cannot afford to pay consulta-
tion fees and retainers are effectively denied justice for lack of legal represen-
tation. Most private arbitral processes allow the option of proceeding without
representation. For those who cannot find representation, this facet of private
arbitration offers some hope, especially if these processes are ultimately engi-
neered to be fair to the employee.
The second benefit of taking the private route relates to a point that
Katherine Stone makes with respect to section 301 preemption in the labor law
setting. She maintains that one of the problems with requiring unionized em-
ployees to take their common law wrongful discharge and tort claims to a
labor arbitrator is that arbitrators do not typically award the same kind of
relief that can be procured in a court of law.95 It seems to me that all the
changes taking place in arbitration processes for nonunion employees must
ultimately inure to the benefit of unionized workers. One reason is that the
charge to change arbitration to ensure its integrity on the nonunion front is
being led by labor arbitrators, among others." In addition, many of the arbi-
trators who currently preside over disputes regarding union employees and
labor contracts will be the very ones who are called to deal with public statu-
tory questions in private nonunion processes. It should be only a matter of
time, if the culture indeed changes, before these same arbitrators are comfort-
able and knowledgeable about awarding punitive and compensatory damages
for common law claims of unionized workers brought in labor arbitration.
Finally, one should not underestimate the ability of the progressive left to
react to change that at first may seem contrary to its goals or agenda. This has
been true, for example, in the case of the Gilmer decision where the left has
acted, with others, to transform private arbitral processes. It is also true in the
case of the Lechmere decision, where the progressive left (in this case, labor
95. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1029.
96. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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unions) also reacted in a uniquely private way. Rather than attempt to reverse
Lechmere, unions responded to a general ban on access to employer property
for organizing purposes by having union organizers apply for jobs in the
workplaces they sought to unionize (a process known as "salting" the
workplace).9 7 The genius of this approach is that it is difficult for employers
to react to it by protesting the means by which such unionization is achieved
without conceding that the government should be more involved in regulating
the hiring process. And although employers did attempt to argue, within the
labor laws, that they should be able to reject job applicants who would have
divided loyalties, the Supreme Court, relying upon master/servant principles
ironically forged during the era of common law formalism, rejected the
employers' pleas.98 As a result, unions have increasingly come to use em-
ployee organizers, a more effective tool for organizing workers than mere
access. 9
I have maintained in this essay that the left should not be so quick to
condemn private arbitration of statutory rights for two primary reasons. First,
although these processes have historically been seized by employers as an
efficient, less costly alternative to litigation devoid of due process safeguards,
there is nothing inherent in private arbitration to prevent making the process
fairer for employees. Second, there is a substantial payoff that justifies the
work required by those on the left to transform these processes for the better-
ment of employees. That payoff is greater access to justice. Private arbitration
holds the potential to eliminate institutional barriers that block access to public
courts by some employees. In conclusion, although there is much work to be
done, the seeds of co-optation of the private realm by the progressive left in
labor and employment law already seem to have been planted.
97. See generally Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Or-
ganizers, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (arguing that the Lechmere decision creates a powerful
incentive for increased use of "salting," compelling union organizers to become statutory employ-
ees).
98. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995). Town & Country,
which reflects a Supreme Court tilt in favor of old common law formalist protection of the private
master/servant relationship, provides more evidence of the New Private Law in the labor and
employment arena.
99. Cf generally Jeffrey A. Mello, The Enemy Within: When Paid Union Organizers Be-
come Employees, 1996 LAB. L.J. 677.
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